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Geopolitics of scarcity shapes a new global order: The end of the age of abundance

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Geopolitika oskudice kroji novi globalni poredak: Kraj ere izobilja
Golema iluzija o neograničenom rastu, jeftinoj energiji i beskrajnim lancima snabdevanja je srušena. Decenijama unazad, od pada Berlinskog zida pa sve do izbijanja pandemije korona virusa 2020. godine, globalna… Ceo tekst
Golema iluzija o neograničenom rastu, jeftinoj energiji i beskrajnim lancima snabdevanja je srušena. Decenijama unazad, od pada Berlinskog zida pa sve do izbijanja pandemije korona virusa 2020. godine, globalna ekonomija funkcionisala je na pretpostavci neograničenog izobilja i stalnog rasta životnog stadarda. Hladnoratovski budžeti za odbranu preusmereni su u potrošnju, stotine miliona radnika iz Azije i Istočne Evrope uskočile su u globalni proizvodni pogon, a sirovine i energenti tekli su neometano, vođeni isključivo tržišnom logikom najniže cene. Danas je taj svet mrtav. Ulazimo u novu epohu geopolitičkog takmičenja u kojoj oskudica više nije prolazni poremećaj na tržištu, već trajno stanje i primarni odnos moći.
14.10.
2026.
Profesor Branko Glavonjić objašnjava šta utiče na cene ogreva i da li se mogu očekivati nova poskupljenja.
Suton četvorodecenijskog eldorada
Četiri decenije stabilnosti bile su anomalija, a ne zakonitost istorije. Centralni bankari su dominirali ekonomskom politikom, držeći inflaciju pod kontrolom pre svega zahvaljujući jeftinom kineskom radu i jeftinim ruskim resursima. Sistem je bio projektovan za efikasnost, a ne za otpornost.
Pucanjem globalizacijskih šavova pod udarima pandemije, rata u Ukrajini i sve oštrijeg tehnološko-ekonomskog sukoba između Vašingtona i Pekinga, razotkrivena je surova ranjivost takvog modela. Sve što je do juče smatrano nepotrebnim troškom, poput strateških zaliha, domaćih prerađivačkih kapaciteta i rezervnih energetskih mreža, danas predstavlja jedinu razliku između suvereniteta i ekonomske kapitulacije.
Glavni pokretači savremenog doba, od elektrifikacije i masovne primene veštačke inteligencije do ponovnog globalnog naoružavanja, enormno su materijalno intenzivni. Izgradnja data-centara, polaganje naponskih mreža i tranzicija na obnovljive izvore zahtevaju ogromne količine bakra, litijuma, kobalta i retkih metala. Procene ukazuju da će se samo potrošnja električne energije u centrima za obradu podataka više nego udvostručiti do kraja ove decenije. Istovremeno, nerazvijeni svet traži svoj deo kolača kroz baznu infrastrukturu, zahtevajući milione tona čelika i nafte. Potražnja je eksplozivna i hitna, dok je ponuda nedovoljna i spora. Otvaranje novog rudnika traje od 10 do 15 godina, a investicije su godinama gušene restriktivnim ekološkim regulativama i finansijskim špekulacijama.
Anatomija organizovane oskudice
Oskudica 21. veka ne znači nužno da je planeta potpuno ostala bez nafte, bakra, pšenice ili vode. Centralna teza nove realnosti jeste da pristup onome što postoji postaje skuplji, uslovljeniji i politički posredovan. Moć više ne leži kod onoga ko poseduje sirovinu, niti isključivo kod onoga ko je troši, već kod aktera koji kontroliše nezamenljiva uska grla lanaca vrednosti.
Savremena nestašica manifestuje se kroz četiri različite, ali usko povezane dimenzije:
Prva je fizička oskudica, uzrokovana iscrpljivanjem prirodnih resursa, učestalim sušama i uništenjem bazne infrastrukture, čije su geopolitičke posledice direktna borba za preživljavanje i masovne demografske migracije.
Druga je proizvodno-tehnološka oskudica, gde ključni problem nije nedostatak same sirovine, već manjak prerađivačkih kapaciteta, pa i patenata za napredna rešenja, što manje razvijene države dovodi u potpunu zavisnost od tehnoloških monopolista.
Treća je logističko-politička oskudica, stvorena sankcijama, izvoznim blokadama i kontrolom ključnih pomorskih prolaza, čiji je rezultat strmoglava fragmentacija svetskog tržišta na suprotstavljene političke i ekonomske blokove.
Konačno, četvrta je cenovna odnosno tržišna oskudica, gde roba fizički postoji, ali se preusmerava isključivo ka onim akterima koji mogu da plate više, čime se stvara duboka klasna distribucija nestašice i osiromašenje najranjivijih slojeva društva.
Kapitulacija centralnih banaka
Peking ne mora da poseduje sve svetske kopove retkih metala da bi diktirao uslove auto-industriji Evrope i Amerike; dovoljno je što kontroliše preko 80 procenata njihove prerade. Slično tome, Sjedinjene Američke Države kontrolišu ključne patente i opremu za proizvodnju najnaprednijih mikročipova, čime efikasno mogu odseći čitave ekonomije od tehnološkog vrha.
28.10.
2026.
Integralni tost, avokado, jaja i povrće: nutricionistkinja otkriva večeru koju sprema za 10 minuta kada nema energije za dugo kuvanje.
„U takvim okolnostima, tržište više ne rešava nestašicu neposredno, ono je samo raspodeljuje. Kada ponuda stane, cena ne podstiče trenutno novu proizvodnju jer se rudnik ili rafinerija ne mogu podići preko noći. Tržište tada funkcioniše kao mehanizam selekcije: roba ide bogatijim državama i korporacijama koje mogu da ponude višu cenu, dok nerazvijene nacije i siromašniji slojevi stanovništva bivaju potisnuti ispod crte egzistencije“, kaže u svojoj analizi za “Tumorouz afers” savetnik predsednika Indije Ananta Nagesvaren.
U analizi Rojtersa od 19. oktobra o poremećaju na energetskom tržištu konstatuje se da preokret u prirodi oskudice menja sam temelj makroekonomske politike. Decenijama je vladala dogma da centralne banke podizanjem ili spuštanjem kamatnih stopa mogu upravljati ekonomskim ciklusima. Međutim, u svetu strukturnih poremećaja ponude, monetarna politika postaje prilično nemoćna. Više kamatne stope ne mogu iskopati tonu bakra, niti mogu proizvesti barijum ili naftu. Zapravo, agresivno monetarno zatezanje često pogoršava problem: ono poskupljuje kapital i guši dugoročna ulaganja u eksploataciju i preradu, čime direktno utiče da buduća ponuda bude još manja, a inflacija otpornija.
„Ulazimo u eru gde monetarna politika mora igrati drugu violinu u odnosu na fiskalnu politiku. Izabrani političari ponovo preuzimaju poluge moći od neizabranih tehnokrata u centralnim bankama. Energetska bezbednost, industrijski kapaciteti i obezbeđivanje kritičnih resursa postaju primarni nacionalni ciljevi kojima se podređuju budžetski deficiti i kursne politike“, kaže se u oktobarskoj analizi francuskog portala Atlaslimits o ograničenim resursima.
Nacionalne države ulaze u trku subvencija i protekcionizma. Ipak, tu leži ogromna zamka: ukoliko se fiskalna sredstva usmere na široke neselektivne subvencije koje samo podstiču potrošnju bez širenja proizvodnih kapaciteta, rezultat će biti razorna stagflacija. Pobeđivaće one države čije uprave uspeju da drastično skrate birokratske procedure — gde brzi pristanak za otvaranje rudnika, litijumske prerade ili visokonaponske mreže postaje glavna konkurentska prednost u odnosu na sporije i administrativno zamršene sisteme.
Hrana i voda kao oružje
Nigde geopolitika oskudice nije tako surova kao u sektoru proizvodnje hrane i pristupa pitkoj vodi. Uprkos globalnom tehnološkom napretku, glad ne nastaje zato što na globalnom nivou nema dovoljno hrane, već zato što su lanci distribucije, kupovna moć i pristup hrani usko povezani sa geopolitičkim interesima.
Izveštaj UNCTAD-a pokazuje drastičnu tržišnu koncentraciju: svega četiri globalne korporacije (poznate pod akronimom ABCD, Arčer Danijels Midlend, Bunge, Kargil, Luj Drajfus) kontrolišu između 70 i 90 odsto svetske trgovine žitaricama. Ova neviđena koncentracija logističke i trgovačke moći znači da nekoliko privatnih upravnih odbora odlučuje o tokovima hrane i maržama u trenucima krize.
Dodatno, proizvodnja hrane zavisi od inputa čija su tržišta jednako monopolizovana: sintetičkih đubriva, prirodnog gasa, selektovanog semena i patenata za zaštitna sredstva.
30.10.
2026.
Na evidenciji službi za zapošljavanje u oktobru bilo je 654.000 slobodnih radnih mesta, što je 31.000 više nego godinu dana ranije.
„Kada cene energetskih inputa skoče, poljoprivrednici u zemljama u razvoju prestaju sa primenom moderne agrotehnike, što dovodi do strmoglavog pada prinosa“, upozorava Ananta Nagesvaren.
Kada nastupi kriza, države pribegavaju odbrambenom nacionalizmu. Zabrane izvoza pšenice ili pirinča koje uvode vodeći proizvođači kako bi umirili domaće cene trenutno prelivaju katastrofu na zemlje zavisne od uvoza. U situacijama ratnih sukoba, poput rata u Ukrajini ili kriza na Bliskom istoku, hrana prestaje da bude trgovačka roba i postaje oružje za masovno ucenjivanje ili preživljavanje.
Logika geopolitičke kontrole preliva se sa međunarodnog terena direktno u unutrašnje odnose unutar samih država. Oskudica se sve češće transformiše u izvor rentijerskog profita.
„Ograničena ponuda stanova u velikim urbanim centrima ne rešava se ubrzanom gradnjom, jer postojećim vlasnicima kapitala i nekretnina odgovara održavanje visokih cena kvadratnih metara i zakupnina. Pristup kreditnim sredstvima postaje privilegija etabliranih igrača, dok se novi preduzetnici potiskuju na marginu“, piše u svojoj analizi evropska istraživačka mreža TEPSA.
Renta iz planirane nestašice postaje dominantan oblik zarade. Javne usluge, od zdravstva i obrazovanja, do čiste vode i snabdevanja strujom postepeno se prenose na privatni sektor, gde se pristup naplaćuje po tržišnim cenama, koje prosečan građanin sve teže prati. Društvo tako može ostvarivati nominalni rast bruto domaćeg proizvoda, dok istovremeno većina stanovništva živi u stanju hronične i ciljane uskraćenosti.
Doba izobilja nije bilo prirodno stanje stvari, već kratka i neponovljiva istorijska anomalija. Decenije u kojima je kapital bio besplatan, resursi jeftini, a lanci snabdevanja neupitni ostale su iza nas. Nova geopolitička realnost ne ostavlja mesta za iluzije. Svet je ušao u epohu u kojoj se surovim političkim i ekonomskim polugama upravlja nestašicama. Države koje budu čekale povratak starog poretka osudile su sebe na ekonomsku periferiju i društvenu destabilizaciju.
U ovakvom poretku, sama fizička posedovanja nafte, bakra ili litijuma više ne garantuju ni bogatstvo ni bezbednost. Pobednici nove epohe neće biti nacije koje leže na rudama i plodnoj zemlji, već one koje pokažu institucionalnu zrelost da iznesu tri ključna strateška imperativa.
Svet izobilja i svet tvrdih granica
„Prvo, imperativ je skraćivanje i beskompromisna zaštita industrijsko-tehnoloških lanaca prerade. Posedovati sirovinu bez kontrole nad njenom preradom predstavlja samo novu formu kolonijalne zavisnosti. Stvarni suverenitet leži u tehnološkoj karici koja diktira uslove tržištu. Drugo, brzina delovanja državne administracije postaje primarni ekonomski resurs. U trci za energijom i sirovinama, efikasnost pri odobravanju infrastrukturnih, rudarskih i energetskih projekata pravi direktnu razliku između funkcionalne privrede i industrijskog zastoja. Birokratska sporost i višegodišnja oklevanja nisu administrativni nedostatak, već direktna pretnja nacionalnoj bezbednosti. Treće, stabilnost države zavisiće od izgradnje unutrašnjih mehanizama pravedne raspodele baznih resursa: hrane, vode i energije. Ukoliko se trošak spoljne oskudice prebaci isključivo na siromašnije slojeve društva kroz privatizaciju renti i neciljane subvencije, geopolitički pritisak neizbežno eskalira u unutrašnji sociološki slom i gubitak legitimiteta vlasti“, kaže se u analizi TEPSA.
Svet izobilja trajno je zamenjen svetom tvrdih granica, kontrolisanih lanaca i politizovanih resursa. U takvom okruženju, pravo na razvoj i suverenitet više se ne pretpostavljaju kao međunarodni standard. Za njih se države moraju izboriti industrijskom moći, tehnološkom prevlašću i sposobnošću upravljanja sopstvenom oskudicom.
Srbija - zemlja velikih reka i suvih njiva
Srbija voli da se predstavlja kao zemlja koja može da prehrani sebe i druge. Brojke iz zvaničnih izvora pokazuju da je slika složenija, i da hrana i voda zavise od stvari koje ne zavise samo od nas.
Srbija u trgovini poljoprivrednim proizvodima ima suficit, ali deo uvoza čine seme, đubrivo i gorivo, pa je proizvodnja zavisna od inputa koje ne stvara sama. To nije nestašica, ali jeste ranjivost.
Više od 90 odsto obnovljivih vodnih resursa Srbije potiče iz inostranstva. To ne znači da pijemo uvoznu vodu, ali znači da sušu, zagađenje i poplave ne rešavamo sami. Pa ipak, i ono što imamo gubimo: od 711 miliona kubnih metara zahvaćenih za javno snabdevanje prošle godine do potrošača je stiglo 445 miliona. Preostalih 266 miliona, oko 37 odsto, izgubljeno je u mreži.
Još upadljivija je razlika između vode i njiva. Navodnjava se oko 47.500 hektara, svega oko 1,5 odsto korišćenog poljoprivrednog zemljišta. Prošle godine zahvaćeno je skoro 18 odsto više vode za navodnjavanje, a navodnjavana površina se ipak smanjila. Kad se vrućina i suša poklope s kritičnom fazom useva, proizvodnja je ozbiljno ugrožena.
Zato pitanje nije hoće li nestati hrane ili vode, već ko odlučuje o raspodeli vode kad dođe do suše i ko plaća obnovu vodosnabdevanja. Sistemska ranjivost nije isto što i neposredna opasnost, ali je upravo ono što ostaje neuređeno dok ne stigne suša. Plodno zemljište i velike reke su važan resurs, ali je još važnije ono što uradimo s njima pre krize, a ne posle nje.
09:00
NIN (otvara se u novom prozoru)
Geopolitics of scarcity shapes a new global order: The end of the age of abundance
The vast illusion of unlimited growth, cheap energy and endless supply chains has collapsed. For decades, from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, the global economy operated… Ceo tekst
The vast illusion of unlimited growth, cheap energy and endless supply chains has collapsed. For decades, from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, the global economy operated on the assumption of unlimited abundance and continuously rising living standards. Cold War defence budgets were redirected into consumption, hundreds of millions of workers from Asia and Eastern Europe joined the global manufacturing machine, and raw materials and energy flowed without obstruction, guided solely by the market logic of the lowest price. Today, that world is dead. We are entering a new era of geopolitical competition in which scarcity is no longer a temporary market disruption, but a permanent condition and a primary instrument of power.
Twilight of a four-decade Eldorado
Four decades of stability were an anomaly, not a law of history. Central bankers dominated economic policy, keeping inflation under control largely thanks to cheap Chinese labour and cheap Russian resources. The system was designed for efficiency, not resilience.
As the seams of globalisation split under the impact of the pandemic, the war in Ukraine and the increasingly sharp technological and economic confrontation between Washington and Beijing, the harsh vulnerability of such a model was exposed. Everything that until recently was considered an unnecessary cost, such as strategic reserves, domestic processing capacity and backup energy networks, today represents the only difference between sovereignty and economic capitulation.
The main drivers of the modern age, from electrification and the mass deployment of artificial intelligence to renewed global rearmament, are enormously material-intensive. The construction of data centres, the laying of power grids and the transition to renewable energy sources require vast quantities of copper, lithium, cobalt and rare metals. Estimates indicate that electricity consumption in data centres alone will more than double by the end of this decade. At the same time, the developing world is demanding its share through basic infrastructure, requiring millions of tonnes of steel and oil. Demand is explosive and urgent, while supply is inadequate and slow. Opening a new mine takes between 10 and 15 years, and investment has for years been stifled by restrictive environmental regulations and financial speculation.
Anatomy of organised scarcity
Scarcity in the 21st century does not necessarily mean that the planet has completely run out of oil, copper, wheat or water. The central thesis of the new reality is that access to what exists is becoming more expensive, more conditional and more politically mediated. Power no longer lies with whoever owns the raw material, nor exclusively with whoever consumes it, but with the actor who controls the irreplaceable bottlenecks in value chains.
Modern shortages are expressed through four distinct, but closely connected, dimensions:
The first is physical scarcity, caused by the depletion of natural resources, frequent droughts and the destruction of basic infrastructure, whose geopolitical consequences are a direct struggle for survival and mass demographic migration.
The second is production and technological scarcity, where the key problem is not the lack of the raw material itself, but a shortage of processing capacity, and even of patents for advanced solutions, which leaves less developed states completely dependent on technological monopolists.
The third is logistical and political scarcity, created by sanctions, export blockades and control of key maritime chokepoints, resulting in the rapid fragmentation of the world market into opposing political and economic blocs.
Finally, the fourth is price, or market, scarcity, where goods physically exist but are redirected exclusively to those actors who can pay more, creating a deep class-based distribution of shortages and impoverishing the most vulnerable sections of society.
Capitulation of central banks
Beijing does not need to own all the world’s rare metal mines to dictate terms to the car industry in Europe and America; it is enough that it controls more than 80 per cent of their processing. Similarly, the United States controls key patents and equipment for producing the most advanced microchips, effectively giving it the power to cut entire economies off from the technological frontier.
“In such circumstances, the market no longer resolves scarcity directly, it merely allocates it. When supply stops, price does not immediately stimulate new production, because a mine or refinery cannot be built overnight. The market then functions as a mechanism of selection: goods go to richer states and corporations that can offer a higher price, while developing nations and poorer segments of the population are pushed below the threshold of subsistence,” says Indian presidential adviser Ananta Nageswaran in his analysis for “Tomorrow’s Affairs”.
A Reuters analysis of 10/19 on disruption in the energy market states that this reversal in the nature of scarcity is changing the very foundation of macroeconomic policy. For decades, the prevailing dogma was that central banks could manage economic cycles by raising or lowering interest rates. However, in a world of structural supply disruptions, monetary policy becomes largely powerless. Higher interest rates cannot dig up a tonne of copper, nor can they produce barium or oil. In fact, aggressive monetary tightening often worsens the problem: it makes capital more expensive and suppresses long-term investment in extraction and processing, directly reducing future supply even further and making inflation more persistent.
“We are entering an era in which monetary policy must play second fiddle to fiscal policy. Elected politicians are once again taking over the levers of power from unelected technocrats in central banks. Energy security, industrial capacity and securing critical resources are becoming primary national goals, to which budget deficits and exchange-rate policies are subordinated,” according to an October analysis by the French portal Atlaslimits on limited resources.
Nation states are entering a race of subsidies and protectionism. Yet this is where a huge trap lies: if fiscal resources are directed towards broad, non-selective subsidies that merely stimulate consumption without expanding productive capacity, the result will be destructive stagflation. The winners will be those states whose administrations manage to drastically shorten bureaucratic procedures, where swift approval for opening mines, lithium-processing plants or high-voltage grids becomes the main competitive advantage over slower, administratively paralysed systems.
Food and water as weapons
Nowhere is the geopolitics of scarcity as harsh as in the sectors of food production and access to drinking water. Despite global technological progress, hunger does not arise because there is not enough food at the global level, but because distribution chains, purchasing power and access to food are closely tied to geopolitical interests.
A report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) shows an extreme concentration of the market: just four global corporations, known by the acronym ABCD — Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus — control between 70 and 90 per cent of the world grain trade. This unprecedented concentration of logistical and commercial power means that a few private boardrooms decide food flows and profit margins in times of crisis.
In addition, food production depends on inputs whose markets are equally monopolised: synthetic fertilisers, natural gas, selected seed and patents for crop protection products.
“When the prices of energy inputs rise, farmers in developing countries stop using modern agricultural technology, which leads to a steep fall in yields,” Ananta Nageswaran warns.
When crisis strikes, states turn to defensive nationalism. Export bans on wheat or rice introduced by leading producers to calm domestic prices immediately transfer catastrophe to import-dependent countries. In wartime situations, such as the war in Ukraine or crises in the Middle East, food ceases to be a commercial commodity and becomes a weapon of mass coercion or survival.
The logic of geopolitical control spills over from the international arena directly into internal relations within states themselves. Scarcity is increasingly being transformed into a source of rentier profit.
“The limited supply of housing in major urban centres is not addressed through accelerated construction, because existing owners of capital and property benefit from keeping square-metre prices and rents high. Access to credit becomes the privilege of established players, while new entrepreneurs are pushed to the margins,” the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) writes in its analysis.
Rent from planned scarcity is becoming the dominant form of profit. Public services, from healthcare and education to clean water and electricity supply, are gradually being transferred to the private sector, where access is charged at market prices that the average citizen finds increasingly difficult to afford. Society may thus achieve nominal gross domestic product growth, while at the same time the majority of the population lives in a state of chronic and targeted deprivation.
The age of abundance was not the natural state of affairs, but a short and unrepeatable historical anomaly. The decades in which capital was free, resources cheap and supply chains unquestioned are behind us. The new geopolitical reality leaves no room for illusions. The world has entered an era in which shortages are managed through harsh political and economic levers. States that wait for the return of the old order have condemned themselves to economic periphery and social destabilisation.
In such an order, mere physical possession of oil, copper or lithium no longer guarantees either wealth or security. The winners of the new era will not be the nations that sit on ore deposits and fertile land, but those that show the institutional maturity to deliver on three key strategic imperatives.
A world of abundance and a world of hard limits
“First, the imperative is to shorten and uncompromisingly protect industrial and technological processing chains. Possessing a raw material without control over its processing is merely a new form of colonial dependence. Real sovereignty lies in the technological link that dictates terms to the market. Second, the speed of state administration is becoming a primary economic resource. In the race for energy and raw materials, efficiency in approving infrastructure, mining and energy projects makes a direct difference between a functioning economy and industrial paralysis. Bureaucratic slowness and years of hesitation are not an administrative flaw, but a direct threat to national security. Third, the stability of the state will depend on building internal mechanisms for the fair distribution of basic resources: food, water and energy. If the cost of external scarcity is shifted exclusively onto poorer sections of society through the privatisation of rents and untargeted subsidies, geopolitical pressure will inevitably escalate into internal social collapse and a loss of governmental legitimacy,” the TEPSA analysis says.
The world of abundance has been permanently replaced by a world of hard limits, controlled chains and politicised resources. In such an environment, the right to development and sovereignty can no longer be assumed as an international standard. States must fight for them through industrial power, technological superiority and the ability to manage their own scarcity.
Serbia — a land of great rivers and dry fields
Serbia likes to present itself as a country that can feed itself and others. Figures from official sources show that the picture is more complex, and that food and water depend on factors that do not depend solely on us.
Serbia runs a surplus in trade in agricultural products, but part of its imports consists of seed, fertiliser and fuel, meaning that production depends on inputs it does not produce itself. That is not a shortage, but it is a vulnerability.
More than 90 per cent of Serbia’s renewable water resources originate abroad. That does not mean we drink imported water, but it does mean that drought, pollution and floods are not problems we can solve alone. Yet even what we have, we lose: of the 711 million cubic metres taken for public supply last year, 445 million reached consumers. The remaining 266 million, around 37 per cent, was lost in the network.
Even more striking is the gap between water and fields. About 47,500 hectares are irrigated, just around 1.5 per cent of the agricultural land in use. Last year, almost 18 per cent more water was drawn for irrigation, yet the irrigated area still shrank. When heat and drought coincide with a critical stage in crop development, production is seriously threatened.
That is why the question is not whether food or water will disappear, but who decides on the allocation of water when drought arrives and who pays for the restoration of water supply. Systemic vulnerability is not the same as immediate danger, but it is precisely what remains unaddressed until drought hits. Fertile land and great rivers are important resources, but even more important is what we do with them before the crisis, not after it.

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Izbori5. nov, 20:27

RIK objavio konačne rezultate izbora u Srbiji

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Hronologija

09:00

NIN (otvara se u novom prozoru) prvi objavio

Geopolitika oskudice kroji novi globalni poredak: Kraj ere izobilja

Golema iluzija o neograničenom rastu, jeftinoj energiji i beskrajnim lancima snabdevanja je srušena. Decenijama unazad, od pada Berlinskog zida pa sve do izbijanja pandemije korona virusa 2020. godine, globalna ekonomija funkcionisala je na pretpostavci neograničenog izobilja i stalnog rasta životnog stadarda. Hladnoratovski budžeti za odbranu preusmereni su u potrošnju, stotine miliona radnika iz Azije i Istočne Evrope uskočile su u globalni proizvodni pogon, a sirovine i energenti tekli su neometano, vođeni isključivo tržišnom logikom najniže cene. Danas je taj svet mrtav. Ulazimo u novu epohu geopolitičkog takmičenja u kojoj oskudica više nije prolazni poremećaj na tržištu, već trajno stanje i primarni odnos moći.

14.10.

2026.

Profesor Branko Glavonjić objašnjava šta utiče na cene ogreva i da li se mogu očekivati nova poskupljenja.

Suton četvorodecenijskog eldorada

Četiri decenije stabilnosti bile su anomalija, a ne zakonitost istorije. Centralni bankari su dominirali ekonomskom politikom, držeći inflaciju pod kontrolom pre svega zahvaljujući jeftinom kineskom radu i jeftinim ruskim resursima. Sistem je bio projektovan za efikasnost, a ne za otpornost.

Pucanjem globalizacijskih šavova pod udarima pandemije, rata u Ukrajini i sve oštrijeg tehnološko-ekonomskog sukoba između Vašingtona i Pekinga, razotkrivena je surova ranjivost takvog modela. Sve što je do juče smatrano nepotrebnim troškom, poput strateških zaliha, domaćih prerađivačkih kapaciteta i rezervnih energetskih mreža, danas predstavlja jedinu razliku između suvereniteta i ekonomske kapitulacije.

Glavni pokretači savremenog doba, od elektrifikacije i masovne primene veštačke inteligencije do ponovnog globalnog naoružavanja, enormno su materijalno intenzivni. Izgradnja data-centara, polaganje naponskih mreža i tranzicija na obnovljive izvore zahtevaju ogromne količine bakra, litijuma, kobalta i retkih metala. Procene ukazuju da će se samo potrošnja električne energije u centrima za obradu podataka više nego udvostručiti do kraja ove decenije. Istovremeno, nerazvijeni svet traži svoj deo kolača kroz baznu infrastrukturu, zahtevajući milione tona čelika i nafte. Potražnja je eksplozivna i hitna, dok je ponuda nedovoljna i spora. Otvaranje novog rudnika traje od 10 do 15 godina, a investicije su godinama gušene restriktivnim ekološkim regulativama i finansijskim špekulacijama.

Anatomija organizovane oskudice

Oskudica 21. veka ne znači nužno da je planeta potpuno ostala bez nafte, bakra, pšenice ili vode. Centralna teza nove realnosti jeste da pristup onome što postoji postaje skuplji, uslovljeniji i politički posredovan. Moć više ne leži kod onoga ko poseduje sirovinu, niti isključivo kod onoga ko je troši, već kod aktera koji kontroliše nezamenljiva uska grla lanaca vrednosti.

Savremena nestašica manifestuje se kroz četiri različite, ali usko povezane dimenzije:

Prva je fizička oskudica, uzrokovana iscrpljivanjem prirodnih resursa, učestalim sušama i uništenjem bazne infrastrukture, čije su geopolitičke posledice direktna borba za preživljavanje i masovne demografske migracije.

Druga je proizvodno-tehnološka oskudica, gde ključni problem nije nedostatak same sirovine, već manjak prerađivačkih kapaciteta, pa i patenata za napredna rešenja, što manje razvijene države dovodi u potpunu zavisnost od tehnoloških monopolista.

Treća je logističko-politička oskudica, stvorena sankcijama, izvoznim blokadama i kontrolom ključnih pomorskih prolaza, čiji je rezultat strmoglava fragmentacija svetskog tržišta na suprotstavljene političke i ekonomske blokove.

Konačno, četvrta je cenovna odnosno tržišna oskudica, gde roba fizički postoji, ali se preusmerava isključivo ka onim akterima koji mogu da plate više, čime se stvara duboka klasna distribucija nestašice i osiromašenje najranjivijih slojeva društva.

Kapitulacija centralnih banaka

Peking ne mora da poseduje sve svetske kopove retkih metala da bi diktirao uslove auto-industriji Evrope i Amerike; dovoljno je što kontroliše preko 80 procenata njihove prerade. Slično tome, Sjedinjene Američke Države kontrolišu ključne patente i opremu za proizvodnju najnaprednijih mikročipova, čime efikasno mogu odseći čitave ekonomije od tehnološkog vrha.

28.10.

2026.

Integralni tost, avokado, jaja i povrće: nutricionistkinja otkriva večeru koju sprema za 10 minuta kada nema energije za dugo kuvanje.

„U takvim okolnostima, tržište više ne rešava nestašicu neposredno, ono je samo raspodeljuje. Kada ponuda stane, cena ne podstiče trenutno novu proizvodnju jer se rudnik ili rafinerija ne mogu podići preko noći. Tržište tada funkcioniše kao mehanizam selekcije: roba ide bogatijim državama i korporacijama koje mogu da ponude višu cenu, dok nerazvijene nacije i siromašniji slojevi stanovništva bivaju potisnuti ispod crte egzistencije“, kaže u svojoj analizi za “Tumorouz afers” savetnik predsednika Indije Ananta Nagesvaren.

U analizi Rojtersa od 19. oktobra o poremećaju na energetskom tržištu konstatuje se da preokret u prirodi oskudice menja sam temelj makroekonomske politike. Decenijama je vladala dogma da centralne banke podizanjem ili spuštanjem kamatnih stopa mogu upravljati ekonomskim ciklusima. Međutim, u svetu strukturnih poremećaja ponude, monetarna politika postaje prilično nemoćna. Više kamatne stope ne mogu iskopati tonu bakra, niti mogu proizvesti barijum ili naftu. Zapravo, agresivno monetarno zatezanje često pogoršava problem: ono poskupljuje kapital i guši dugoročna ulaganja u eksploataciju i preradu, čime direktno utiče da buduća ponuda bude još manja, a inflacija otpornija.

„Ulazimo u eru gde monetarna politika mora igrati drugu violinu u odnosu na fiskalnu politiku. Izabrani političari ponovo preuzimaju poluge moći od neizabranih tehnokrata u centralnim bankama. Energetska bezbednost, industrijski kapaciteti i obezbeđivanje kritičnih resursa postaju primarni nacionalni ciljevi kojima se podređuju budžetski deficiti i kursne politike“, kaže se u oktobarskoj analizi francuskog portala Atlaslimits o ograničenim resursima.

Nacionalne države ulaze u trku subvencija i protekcionizma. Ipak, tu leži ogromna zamka: ukoliko se fiskalna sredstva usmere na široke neselektivne subvencije koje samo podstiču potrošnju bez širenja proizvodnih kapaciteta, rezultat će biti razorna stagflacija. Pobeđivaće one države čije uprave uspeju da drastično skrate birokratske procedure — gde brzi pristanak za otvaranje rudnika, litijumske prerade ili visokonaponske mreže postaje glavna konkurentska prednost u odnosu na sporije i administrativno zamršene sisteme.

Hrana i voda kao oružje

Nigde geopolitika oskudice nije tako surova kao u sektoru proizvodnje hrane i pristupa pitkoj vodi. Uprkos globalnom tehnološkom napretku, glad ne nastaje zato što na globalnom nivou nema dovoljno hrane, već zato što su lanci distribucije, kupovna moć i pristup hrani usko povezani sa geopolitičkim interesima.

Izveštaj UNCTAD-a pokazuje drastičnu tržišnu koncentraciju: svega četiri globalne korporacije (poznate pod akronimom ABCD, Arčer Danijels Midlend, Bunge, Kargil, Luj Drajfus) kontrolišu između 70 i 90 odsto svetske trgovine žitaricama. Ova neviđena koncentracija logističke i trgovačke moći znači da nekoliko privatnih upravnih odbora odlučuje o tokovima hrane i maržama u trenucima krize.

Dodatno, proizvodnja hrane zavisi od inputa čija su tržišta jednako monopolizovana: sintetičkih đubriva, prirodnog gasa, selektovanog semena i patenata za zaštitna sredstva.

30.10.

2026.

Na evidenciji službi za zapošljavanje u oktobru bilo je 654.000 slobodnih radnih mesta, što je 31.000 više nego godinu dana ranije.

„Kada cene energetskih inputa skoče, poljoprivrednici u zemljama u razvoju prestaju sa primenom moderne agrotehnike, što dovodi do strmoglavog pada prinosa“, upozorava Ananta Nagesvaren.

Kada nastupi kriza, države pribegavaju odbrambenom nacionalizmu. Zabrane izvoza pšenice ili pirinča koje uvode vodeći proizvođači kako bi umirili domaće cene trenutno prelivaju katastrofu na zemlje zavisne od uvoza. U situacijama ratnih sukoba, poput rata u Ukrajini ili kriza na Bliskom istoku, hrana prestaje da bude trgovačka roba i postaje oružje za masovno ucenjivanje ili preživljavanje.

Logika geopolitičke kontrole preliva se sa međunarodnog terena direktno u unutrašnje odnose unutar samih država. Oskudica se sve češće transformiše u izvor rentijerskog profita.

„Ograničena ponuda stanova u velikim urbanim centrima ne rešava se ubrzanom gradnjom, jer postojećim vlasnicima kapitala i nekretnina odgovara održavanje visokih cena kvadratnih metara i zakupnina. Pristup kreditnim sredstvima postaje privilegija etabliranih igrača, dok se novi preduzetnici potiskuju na marginu“, piše u svojoj analizi evropska istraživačka mreža TEPSA.

Renta iz planirane nestašice postaje dominantan oblik zarade. Javne usluge, od zdravstva i obrazovanja, do čiste vode i snabdevanja strujom postepeno se prenose na privatni sektor, gde se pristup naplaćuje po tržišnim cenama, koje prosečan građanin sve teže prati. Društvo tako može ostvarivati nominalni rast bruto domaćeg proizvoda, dok istovremeno većina stanovništva živi u stanju hronične i ciljane uskraćenosti.

Doba izobilja nije bilo prirodno stanje stvari, već kratka i neponovljiva istorijska anomalija. Decenije u kojima je kapital bio besplatan, resursi jeftini, a lanci snabdevanja neupitni ostale su iza nas. Nova geopolitička realnost ne ostavlja mesta za iluzije. Svet je ušao u epohu u kojoj se surovim političkim i ekonomskim polugama upravlja nestašicama. Države koje budu čekale povratak starog poretka osudile su sebe na ekonomsku periferiju i društvenu destabilizaciju.

U ovakvom poretku, sama fizička posedovanja nafte, bakra ili litijuma više ne garantuju ni bogatstvo ni bezbednost. Pobednici nove epohe neće biti nacije koje leže na rudama i plodnoj zemlji, već one koje pokažu institucionalnu zrelost da iznesu tri ključna strateška imperativa.

Svet izobilja i svet tvrdih granica

„Prvo, imperativ je skraćivanje i beskompromisna zaštita industrijsko-tehnoloških lanaca prerade. Posedovati sirovinu bez kontrole nad njenom preradom predstavlja samo novu formu kolonijalne zavisnosti. Stvarni suverenitet leži u tehnološkoj karici koja diktira uslove tržištu. Drugo, brzina delovanja državne administracije postaje primarni ekonomski resurs. U trci za energijom i sirovinama, efikasnost pri odobravanju infrastrukturnih, rudarskih i energetskih projekata pravi direktnu razliku između funkcionalne privrede i industrijskog zastoja. Birokratska sporost i višegodišnja oklevanja nisu administrativni nedostatak, već direktna pretnja nacionalnoj bezbednosti. Treće, stabilnost države zavisiće od izgradnje unutrašnjih mehanizama pravedne raspodele baznih resursa: hrane, vode i energije. Ukoliko se trošak spoljne oskudice prebaci isključivo na siromašnije slojeve društva kroz privatizaciju renti i neciljane subvencije, geopolitički pritisak neizbežno eskalira u unutrašnji sociološki slom i gubitak legitimiteta vlasti“, kaže se u analizi TEPSA.

Svet izobilja trajno je zamenjen svetom tvrdih granica, kontrolisanih lanaca i politizovanih resursa. U takvom okruženju, pravo na razvoj i suverenitet više se ne pretpostavljaju kao međunarodni standard. Za njih se države moraju izboriti industrijskom moći, tehnološkom prevlašću i sposobnošću upravljanja sopstvenom oskudicom.

Srbija - zemlja velikih reka i suvih njiva

Srbija voli da se predstavlja kao zemlja koja može da prehrani sebe i druge. Brojke iz zvaničnih izvora pokazuju da je slika složenija, i da hrana i voda zavise od stvari koje ne zavise samo od nas.

Srbija u trgovini poljoprivrednim proizvodima ima suficit, ali deo uvoza čine seme, đubrivo i gorivo, pa je proizvodnja zavisna od inputa koje ne stvara sama. To nije nestašica, ali jeste ranjivost.

Više od 90 odsto obnovljivih vodnih resursa Srbije potiče iz inostranstva. To ne znači da pijemo uvoznu vodu, ali znači da sušu, zagađenje i poplave ne rešavamo sami. Pa ipak, i ono što imamo gubimo: od 711 miliona kubnih metara zahvaćenih za javno snabdevanje prošle godine do potrošača je stiglo 445 miliona. Preostalih 266 miliona, oko 37 odsto, izgubljeno je u mreži.

Još upadljivija je razlika između vode i njiva. Navodnjava se oko 47.500 hektara, svega oko 1,5 odsto korišćenog poljoprivrednog zemljišta. Prošle godine zahvaćeno je skoro 18 odsto više vode za navodnjavanje, a navodnjavana površina se ipak smanjila. Kad se vrućina i suša poklope s kritičnom fazom useva, proizvodnja je ozbiljno ugrožena.

Zato pitanje nije hoće li nestati hrane ili vode, već ko odlučuje o raspodeli vode kad dođe do suše i ko plaća obnovu vodosnabdevanja. Sistemska ranjivost nije isto što i neposredna opasnost, ali je upravo ono što ostaje neuređeno dok ne stigne suša. Plodno zemljište i velike reke su važan resurs, ali je još važnije ono što uradimo s njima pre krize, a ne posle nje.

09:00

NIN (otvara se u novom prozoru)

Geopolitics of scarcity shapes a new global order: The end of the age of abundance

The vast illusion of unlimited growth, cheap energy and endless supply chains has collapsed. For decades, from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, the global economy operated on the assumption of unlimited abundance and continuously rising living standards. Cold War defence budgets were redirected into consumption, hundreds of millions of workers from Asia and Eastern Europe joined the global manufacturing machine, and raw materials and energy flowed without obstruction, guided solely by the market logic of the lowest price. Today, that world is dead. We are entering a new era of geopolitical competition in which scarcity is no longer a temporary market disruption, but a permanent condition and a primary instrument of power.

Twilight of a four-decade Eldorado

Four decades of stability were an anomaly, not a law of history. Central bankers dominated economic policy, keeping inflation under control largely thanks to cheap Chinese labour and cheap Russian resources. The system was designed for efficiency, not resilience.

As the seams of globalisation split under the impact of the pandemic, the war in Ukraine and the increasingly sharp technological and economic confrontation between Washington and Beijing, the harsh vulnerability of such a model was exposed. Everything that until recently was considered an unnecessary cost, such as strategic reserves, domestic processing capacity and backup energy networks, today represents the only difference between sovereignty and economic capitulation.

The main drivers of the modern age, from electrification and the mass deployment of artificial intelligence to renewed global rearmament, are enormously material-intensive. The construction of data centres, the laying of power grids and the transition to renewable energy sources require vast quantities of copper, lithium, cobalt and rare metals. Estimates indicate that electricity consumption in data centres alone will more than double by the end of this decade. At the same time, the developing world is demanding its share through basic infrastructure, requiring millions of tonnes of steel and oil. Demand is explosive and urgent, while supply is inadequate and slow. Opening a new mine takes between 10 and 15 years, and investment has for years been stifled by restrictive environmental regulations and financial speculation.

Anatomy of organised scarcity

Scarcity in the 21st century does not necessarily mean that the planet has completely run out of oil, copper, wheat or water. The central thesis of the new reality is that access to what exists is becoming more expensive, more conditional and more politically mediated. Power no longer lies with whoever owns the raw material, nor exclusively with whoever consumes it, but with the actor who controls the irreplaceable bottlenecks in value chains.

Modern shortages are expressed through four distinct, but closely connected, dimensions:

The first is physical scarcity, caused by the depletion of natural resources, frequent droughts and the destruction of basic infrastructure, whose geopolitical consequences are a direct struggle for survival and mass demographic migration.

The second is production and technological scarcity, where the key problem is not the lack of the raw material itself, but a shortage of processing capacity, and even of patents for advanced solutions, which leaves less developed states completely dependent on technological monopolists.

The third is logistical and political scarcity, created by sanctions, export blockades and control of key maritime chokepoints, resulting in the rapid fragmentation of the world market into opposing political and economic blocs.

Finally, the fourth is price, or market, scarcity, where goods physically exist but are redirected exclusively to those actors who can pay more, creating a deep class-based distribution of shortages and impoverishing the most vulnerable sections of society.

Capitulation of central banks

Beijing does not need to own all the world’s rare metal mines to dictate terms to the car industry in Europe and America; it is enough that it controls more than 80 per cent of their processing. Similarly, the United States controls key patents and equipment for producing the most advanced microchips, effectively giving it the power to cut entire economies off from the technological frontier.

“In such circumstances, the market no longer resolves scarcity directly, it merely allocates it. When supply stops, price does not immediately stimulate new production, because a mine or refinery cannot be built overnight. The market then functions as a mechanism of selection: goods go to richer states and corporations that can offer a higher price, while developing nations and poorer segments of the population are pushed below the threshold of subsistence,” says Indian presidential adviser Ananta Nageswaran in his analysis for “Tomorrow’s Affairs”.

A Reuters analysis of 10/19 on disruption in the energy market states that this reversal in the nature of scarcity is changing the very foundation of macroeconomic policy. For decades, the prevailing dogma was that central banks could manage economic cycles by raising or lowering interest rates. However, in a world of structural supply disruptions, monetary policy becomes largely powerless. Higher interest rates cannot dig up a tonne of copper, nor can they produce barium or oil. In fact, aggressive monetary tightening often worsens the problem: it makes capital more expensive and suppresses long-term investment in extraction and processing, directly reducing future supply even further and making inflation more persistent.

“We are entering an era in which monetary policy must play second fiddle to fiscal policy. Elected politicians are once again taking over the levers of power from unelected technocrats in central banks. Energy security, industrial capacity and securing critical resources are becoming primary national goals, to which budget deficits and exchange-rate policies are subordinated,” according to an October analysis by the French portal Atlaslimits on limited resources.

Nation states are entering a race of subsidies and protectionism. Yet this is where a huge trap lies: if fiscal resources are directed towards broad, non-selective subsidies that merely stimulate consumption without expanding productive capacity, the result will be destructive stagflation. The winners will be those states whose administrations manage to drastically shorten bureaucratic procedures, where swift approval for opening mines, lithium-processing plants or high-voltage grids becomes the main competitive advantage over slower, administratively paralysed systems.

Food and water as weapons

Nowhere is the geopolitics of scarcity as harsh as in the sectors of food production and access to drinking water. Despite global technological progress, hunger does not arise because there is not enough food at the global level, but because distribution chains, purchasing power and access to food are closely tied to geopolitical interests.

A report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) shows an extreme concentration of the market: just four global corporations, known by the acronym ABCD — Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus — control between 70 and 90 per cent of the world grain trade. This unprecedented concentration of logistical and commercial power means that a few private boardrooms decide food flows and profit margins in times of crisis.

In addition, food production depends on inputs whose markets are equally monopolised: synthetic fertilisers, natural gas, selected seed and patents for crop protection products.

“When the prices of energy inputs rise, farmers in developing countries stop using modern agricultural technology, which leads to a steep fall in yields,” Ananta Nageswaran warns.

When crisis strikes, states turn to defensive nationalism. Export bans on wheat or rice introduced by leading producers to calm domestic prices immediately transfer catastrophe to import-dependent countries. In wartime situations, such as the war in Ukraine or crises in the Middle East, food ceases to be a commercial commodity and becomes a weapon of mass coercion or survival.

The logic of geopolitical control spills over from the international arena directly into internal relations within states themselves. Scarcity is increasingly being transformed into a source of rentier profit.

“The limited supply of housing in major urban centres is not addressed through accelerated construction, because existing owners of capital and property benefit from keeping square-metre prices and rents high. Access to credit becomes the privilege of established players, while new entrepreneurs are pushed to the margins,” the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) writes in its analysis.

Rent from planned scarcity is becoming the dominant form of profit. Public services, from healthcare and education to clean water and electricity supply, are gradually being transferred to the private sector, where access is charged at market prices that the average citizen finds increasingly difficult to afford. Society may thus achieve nominal gross domestic product growth, while at the same time the majority of the population lives in a state of chronic and targeted deprivation.

The age of abundance was not the natural state of affairs, but a short and unrepeatable historical anomaly. The decades in which capital was free, resources cheap and supply chains unquestioned are behind us. The new geopolitical reality leaves no room for illusions. The world has entered an era in which shortages are managed through harsh political and economic levers. States that wait for the return of the old order have condemned themselves to economic periphery and social destabilisation.

In such an order, mere physical possession of oil, copper or lithium no longer guarantees either wealth or security. The winners of the new era will not be the nations that sit on ore deposits and fertile land, but those that show the institutional maturity to deliver on three key strategic imperatives.

A world of abundance and a world of hard limits

“First, the imperative is to shorten and uncompromisingly protect industrial and technological processing chains. Possessing a raw material without control over its processing is merely a new form of colonial dependence. Real sovereignty lies in the technological link that dictates terms to the market. Second, the speed of state administration is becoming a primary economic resource. In the race for energy and raw materials, efficiency in approving infrastructure, mining and energy projects makes a direct difference between a functioning economy and industrial paralysis. Bureaucratic slowness and years of hesitation are not an administrative flaw, but a direct threat to national security. Third, the stability of the state will depend on building internal mechanisms for the fair distribution of basic resources: food, water and energy. If the cost of external scarcity is shifted exclusively onto poorer sections of society through the privatisation of rents and untargeted subsidies, geopolitical pressure will inevitably escalate into internal social collapse and a loss of governmental legitimacy,” the TEPSA analysis says.

The world of abundance has been permanently replaced by a world of hard limits, controlled chains and politicised resources. In such an environment, the right to development and sovereignty can no longer be assumed as an international standard. States must fight for them through industrial power, technological superiority and the ability to manage their own scarcity.

Serbia — a land of great rivers and dry fields

Serbia likes to present itself as a country that can feed itself and others. Figures from official sources show that the picture is more complex, and that food and water depend on factors that do not depend solely on us.

Serbia runs a surplus in trade in agricultural products, but part of its imports consists of seed, fertiliser and fuel, meaning that production depends on inputs it does not produce itself. That is not a shortage, but it is a vulnerability.

More than 90 per cent of Serbia’s renewable water resources originate abroad. That does not mean we drink imported water, but it does mean that drought, pollution and floods are not problems we can solve alone. Yet even what we have, we lose: of the 711 million cubic metres taken for public supply last year, 445 million reached consumers. The remaining 266 million, around 37 per cent, was lost in the network.

Even more striking is the gap between water and fields. About 47,500 hectares are irrigated, just around 1.5 per cent of the agricultural land in use. Last year, almost 18 per cent more water was drawn for irrigation, yet the irrigated area still shrank. When heat and drought coincide with a critical stage in crop development, production is seriously threatened.

That is why the question is not whether food or water will disappear, but who decides on the allocation of water when drought arrives and who pays for the restoration of water supply. Systemic vulnerability is not the same as immediate danger, but it is precisely what remains unaddressed until drought hits. Fertile land and great rivers are important resources, but even more important is what we do with them before the crisis, not after it.