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Esad Kučević: The Vichy syndrome and de Gaulle’s own goal

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Hronologija

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Esad Kučević: Višijevski sindrom i De Golov autogol
Istorija se retko završava onda kad se završe izbori. Ponekad tek tada počinje njen teži deo, u kojem pobednik mora da odluči šta će učiniti sa sopstvenom pobedom. Tradicionalno i već viđeno, poput Srbije u postizbornim… Ceo tekst
Istorija se retko završava onda kad se završe izbori. Ponekad tek tada počinje njen teži deo, u kojem pobednik mora da odluči šta će učiniti sa sopstvenom pobedom.
Tradicionalno i već viđeno, poput Srbije u postizbornim prozivkama, Francuska je posle oslobođenja imala sličnu poziciju. Morala je da pobedi drugu stranu i uspomenu na nju, što nikad nije isto. Gubitnici su zato postali mnogo više od jednog istorijskog režima, neugodan deo biografije koji je lakše proglasiti izuzetkom, nego prihvatiti kao deo sopstvene istorije. Između onoga što se dogodilo i onoga što je društvo spremno da prizna, višijevski sindrom je dugo i nedovršeno suočavanje sa prošlošću koja nije mogla biti jednostavno sahranjena.
General De Gol pobedio je poraz, ali ne i prošlost. Državnik koji je od istorijske nužnosti načinio nacionalnu legendu posle poniženja znao je da je zemlji svetlosti i giljotine potrebna velika priča o sopstvenom dostojanstvu. U toj konstrukciji, opozicicija je postala istorijsko telo koje je trebalo odvojiti od nacionalnog identiteta kako bi se obnovila predstava o kontinuitetu časti. U zemlji Bastilje, bio je to De Golov autogol. Paradoks velike politike koja želi da pobedu pretvori u konačnu moralnu presudu nad prošlošću. Kad se krivica društva izdvoji kao tuđa krivica, ona menja oblik i prelazi u mit, a mit koji se dovoljno dugo brani počinje da se ponaša kao istina.
Vreme, međutim, nikad ne ostaje u granicama jedne moralne podele. Zato prošlost ne prihvata amnestiju. Ona ostaje u imenima, arhivima, porodičnim pričama, političkom jeziku i kolektivnom ćutanju, sve dok jednog dana ne postane jasno da ono što je proglašeno završenom istorijom i dalje određuje način na koji društvo govori o sebi. U takvoj situaciji, višijevski sindrom je metafora za društvo koje pokušava da iz sopstvene biografije izbaci ono što mu se ne dopada, da neprijatnu odgovornost pretvori u tuđu krivicu i da od istorije napravi ogledalo u kojem će gledati samo sopstveni idealizovani lik.
Tu prestaje francuska priča i počinje naše pitanje. Ne zato što Srbija svoje najdublje senke vekovima drži iza zatvorenih kapaka, niti zato što se pariska opozicija može preslikati na bilo koji savremeni srpski događaj, nego zato što ista ljudska i politička potreba postoji i ovde. Francuski slučaj zato nije naš model, nego naše ogledalo. U njemu ne treba tražiti iste događaje, nego isti mehanizam, onu opasnu sklonost da se posle velikog sukoba ne traži istina koja će društvo ponovo povezati, nego priča koja će jednoj njegovoj polovini omogućiti da drugu zauvek proglasi krivom.
Na tom mestu sadašnja Srbija više se ne može zaobići. Ako je pobednik dobio pravo na istinu, a poraženi više nema pravo ni na kakvu istinu, izbori prestaju da budu način da se društvo politički razreši i postaju samo nova etapa njegovog unutrašnjeg sukoba. Onda se vlast više ne doživljava kao privremeno poverenje građana, nego kao dostojanstvo ukroćenog pogleda, a opozicija kao prepreka koju treba ukloniti iz priče o naciji.
Međutim, vlast nije Srbija, opozicija nije Srbija, izborna većina nije Srbija, protestna manjina nije Srbija, kao što nijedan politički trenutak ne može da prisvoji čitavu istoriju jednog naroda. Srbija je veća od svakog rezultata, dublja od svakog mandata i dugotrajnija od svake vlasti, te baš zato svaka politika koja sebe poistoveti sa državom pre ili kasnije počinje da pravi istu grešku, pobedu nad protivnikom pretvara u pokušaj da pobedi pluralnost društva.
Zato se nameće povratak De Golu i njegovom autogolu. Veliki političar može spasiti državu, obnoviti njeno samopouzdanje i ostaviti iza sebe snažan istorijski mit, ali nijedan mit ne može zauvek zameniti istinu. I Srbija će, pre ili kasnije, morati da nauči istu jednostavnu, a tešku lekciju, država ne postaje snažna kad svi govore isto o njoj, nego kad može da podnese različite istine.
Očigledno, glavni ispit su dugotrajni postizborni dani. Da se vidi da li je pobeda prihvaćena kao odgovornost ili kao plen, da li je poraz politička epizoda ili nacionalna katastrofa, da li će institucije ostati iznad partija i da li se društvo posle izbora vraća sebi ili nastavlja da živi kao zarobljenik sopstvene podele.
Razapeto i polarizovano. I neizbežnim povodom, možda je bolje što je život konačan, a naši lični stavovi, dionički principi i životni kompasi beskonačni. Jer, vanredni izbori nisu poslednja, ni izvanredna reč demokratije. Oni su samo trenutak u kojem društvo nekome daje više političke moći nego drugome.
Sve ostalo tek treba da se dogodi.
28.10.
2026.
Integralni tost, avokado, jaja i povrće: nutricionistkinja otkriva večeru koju sprema za 10 minuta kada nema energije za dugo kuvanje.
09:00
NIN (otvara se u novom prozoru)
Esad Kučević: The Vichy syndrome and de Gaulle’s own goal
History rarely ends when elections are over. Sometimes its harder part begins only then, when the winner must decide what to do with victory itself. In a way that is traditional and already familiar, much like Serbia in… Ceo tekst
History rarely ends when elections are over. Sometimes its harder part begins only then, when the winner must decide what to do with victory itself.
In a way that is traditional and already familiar, much like Serbia in its post-election recriminations, France after liberation found itself in a similar position. It had to defeat the other side and the memory of it, which is never the same thing. The losers therefore became much more than a historical regime. They became an uncomfortable part of the national biography, easier to declare an exception than to accept as part of one’s own history. Between what happened and what society is prepared to acknowledge, the Vichy syndrome was a long and incomplete reckoning with a past that could not simply be buried.
General de Gaulle defeated defeat, but not the past. The statesman who turned historical necessity into a national legend after humiliation knew that the land of light and the guillotine needed a grand story about its own dignity. In that construction, the opposition became a historical body that had to be separated from the national identity in order to restore the image of a continuity of honour. In the land of the Bastille (the prison-fortress whose storming symbolised the French Revolution), this was de Gaulle’s own goal. It was the paradox of great politics seeking to turn victory into a final moral judgment on the past. When a society’s guilt is set apart as someone else’s guilt, it changes shape and passes into myth, and a myth defended for long enough begins to behave like truth.
Time, however, never remains within the boundaries of a single moral division. That is why the past does not accept amnesty. It remains in names, archives, family stories, political language and collective silence, until one day it becomes clear that what was declared finished history still shapes the way a society speaks about itself. In such a situation, the Vichy syndrome is a metaphor for a society trying to remove from its own biography what it does not like, to turn uncomfortable responsibility into someone else’s guilt, and to make history into a mirror in which it sees only its own idealised image.
That is where the French story ends and our question begins. Not because Serbia has kept its deepest shadows behind closed eyelids for centuries, nor because the Parisian opposition can be mapped directly onto any contemporary Serbian event, but because the same human and political need exists here as well. The French case is therefore not our model, but our mirror. One should not look in it for the same events, but for the same mechanism: that dangerous tendency, after a major conflict, not to seek the truth that will reconnect society, but a story that will allow one half of it to declare the other guilty for ever.
At this point, present-day Serbia can no longer be avoided. If the winner has acquired the right to truth, while the defeated no longer have the right to any truth at all, elections cease to be a way for society to resolve its political differences and become merely a new stage in its internal conflict. Power is then no longer seen as the temporary trust of citizens, but as the dignity of a tamed gaze, while the opposition is seen as an obstacle to be removed from the story of the nation.
However, the government is not Serbia, the opposition is not Serbia, the electoral majority is not Serbia, the protesting minority is not Serbia, just as no political moment can appropriate the entire history of a nation. Serbia is greater than any result, deeper than any mandate and longer-lasting than any government. That is precisely why every politics that identifies itself with the state sooner or later begins to make the same mistake, turning victory over an opponent into an attempt to defeat the plurality of society.
That is why a return to de Gaulle and his own goal suggests itself. A great politician may save the state, restore its self-confidence and leave behind a powerful historical myth, but no myth can replace the truth for ever. Serbia too, sooner or later, will have to learn the same simple yet difficult lesson: a state does not become strong when everyone says the same thing about it, but when it can endure different truths.
Clearly, the main test lies in the long post-election days. They will show whether victory has been accepted as responsibility or as spoils, whether defeat is a political episode or a national catastrophe, whether institutions will remain above parties, and whether society returns to itself after elections or continues to live as a prisoner of its own division.
Stretched and polarised. And for an unavoidable reason, perhaps it is better that life is finite, while our personal views, principled convictions and life compasses are infinite. For snap elections are neither the last nor the extraordinary word of democracy. They are only a moment in which society gives one side more political power than another.
Everything else has yet to happen.

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Izbori5. nov, 20:27

RIK objavio konačne rezultate izbora u Srbiji

5 medijaKurir, B92, Espreso …

Hronologija

09:00

NIN (otvara se u novom prozoru) prvi objavio

Esad Kučević: Višijevski sindrom i De Golov autogol

Istorija se retko završava onda kad se završe izbori. Ponekad tek tada počinje njen teži deo, u kojem pobednik mora da odluči šta će učiniti sa sopstvenom pobedom. Tradicionalno i već viđeno, poput Srbije u postizbornim… Ceo tekst

Istorija se retko završava onda kad se završe izbori. Ponekad tek tada počinje njen teži deo, u kojem pobednik mora da odluči šta će učiniti sa sopstvenom pobedom.

Tradicionalno i već viđeno, poput Srbije u postizbornim prozivkama, Francuska je posle oslobođenja imala sličnu poziciju. Morala je da pobedi drugu stranu i uspomenu na nju, što nikad nije isto. Gubitnici su zato postali mnogo više od jednog istorijskog režima, neugodan deo biografije koji je lakše proglasiti izuzetkom, nego prihvatiti kao deo sopstvene istorije. Između onoga što se dogodilo i onoga što je društvo spremno da prizna, višijevski sindrom je dugo i nedovršeno suočavanje sa prošlošću koja nije mogla biti jednostavno sahranjena.

General De Gol pobedio je poraz, ali ne i prošlost. Državnik koji je od istorijske nužnosti načinio nacionalnu legendu posle poniženja znao je da je zemlji svetlosti i giljotine potrebna velika priča o sopstvenom dostojanstvu. U toj konstrukciji, opozicicija je postala istorijsko telo koje je trebalo odvojiti od nacionalnog identiteta kako bi se obnovila predstava o kontinuitetu časti. U zemlji Bastilje, bio je to De Golov autogol. Paradoks velike politike koja želi da pobedu pretvori u konačnu moralnu presudu nad prošlošću. Kad se krivica društva izdvoji kao tuđa krivica, ona menja oblik i prelazi u mit, a mit koji se dovoljno dugo brani počinje da se ponaša kao istina.

Vreme, međutim, nikad ne ostaje u granicama jedne moralne podele. Zato prošlost ne prihvata amnestiju. Ona ostaje u imenima, arhivima, porodičnim pričama, političkom jeziku i kolektivnom ćutanju, sve dok jednog dana ne postane jasno da ono što je proglašeno završenom istorijom i dalje određuje način na koji društvo govori o sebi. U takvoj situaciji, višijevski sindrom je metafora za društvo koje pokušava da iz sopstvene biografije izbaci ono što mu se ne dopada, da neprijatnu odgovornost pretvori u tuđu krivicu i da od istorije napravi ogledalo u kojem će gledati samo sopstveni idealizovani lik.

Tu prestaje francuska priča i počinje naše pitanje. Ne zato što Srbija svoje najdublje senke vekovima drži iza zatvorenih kapaka, niti zato što se pariska opozicija može preslikati na bilo koji savremeni srpski događaj, nego zato što ista ljudska i politička potreba postoji i ovde. Francuski slučaj zato nije naš model, nego naše ogledalo. U njemu ne treba tražiti iste događaje, nego isti mehanizam, onu opasnu sklonost da se posle velikog sukoba ne traži istina koja će društvo ponovo povezati, nego priča koja će jednoj njegovoj polovini omogućiti da drugu zauvek proglasi krivom.

Na tom mestu sadašnja Srbija više se ne može zaobići. Ako je pobednik dobio pravo na istinu, a poraženi više nema pravo ni na kakvu istinu, izbori prestaju da budu način da se društvo politički razreši i postaju samo nova etapa njegovog unutrašnjeg sukoba. Onda se vlast više ne doživljava kao privremeno poverenje građana, nego kao dostojanstvo ukroćenog pogleda, a opozicija kao prepreka koju treba ukloniti iz priče o naciji.

Međutim, vlast nije Srbija, opozicija nije Srbija, izborna većina nije Srbija, protestna manjina nije Srbija, kao što nijedan politički trenutak ne može da prisvoji čitavu istoriju jednog naroda. Srbija je veća od svakog rezultata, dublja od svakog mandata i dugotrajnija od svake vlasti, te baš zato svaka politika koja sebe poistoveti sa državom pre ili kasnije počinje da pravi istu grešku, pobedu nad protivnikom pretvara u pokušaj da pobedi pluralnost društva.

Zato se nameće povratak De Golu i njegovom autogolu. Veliki političar može spasiti državu, obnoviti njeno samopouzdanje i ostaviti iza sebe snažan istorijski mit, ali nijedan mit ne može zauvek zameniti istinu. I Srbija će, pre ili kasnije, morati da nauči istu jednostavnu, a tešku lekciju, država ne postaje snažna kad svi govore isto o njoj, nego kad može da podnese različite istine.

Očigledno, glavni ispit su dugotrajni postizborni dani. Da se vidi da li je pobeda prihvaćena kao odgovornost ili kao plen, da li je poraz politička epizoda ili nacionalna katastrofa, da li će institucije ostati iznad partija i da li se društvo posle izbora vraća sebi ili nastavlja da živi kao zarobljenik sopstvene podele.

Razapeto i polarizovano. I neizbežnim povodom, možda je bolje što je život konačan, a naši lični stavovi, dionički principi i životni kompasi beskonačni. Jer, vanredni izbori nisu poslednja, ni izvanredna reč demokratije. Oni su samo trenutak u kojem društvo nekome daje više političke moći nego drugome.

Sve ostalo tek treba da se dogodi.

28.10.

2026.

Integralni tost, avokado, jaja i povrće: nutricionistkinja otkriva večeru koju sprema za 10 minuta kada nema energije za dugo kuvanje.

09:00

NIN (otvara se u novom prozoru)

Esad Kučević: The Vichy syndrome and de Gaulle’s own goal

History rarely ends when elections are over. Sometimes its harder part begins only then, when the winner must decide what to do with victory itself. In a way that is traditional and already familiar, much like Serbia in… Ceo tekst

History rarely ends when elections are over. Sometimes its harder part begins only then, when the winner must decide what to do with victory itself.

In a way that is traditional and already familiar, much like Serbia in its post-election recriminations, France after liberation found itself in a similar position. It had to defeat the other side and the memory of it, which is never the same thing. The losers therefore became much more than a historical regime. They became an uncomfortable part of the national biography, easier to declare an exception than to accept as part of one’s own history. Between what happened and what society is prepared to acknowledge, the Vichy syndrome was a long and incomplete reckoning with a past that could not simply be buried.

General de Gaulle defeated defeat, but not the past. The statesman who turned historical necessity into a national legend after humiliation knew that the land of light and the guillotine needed a grand story about its own dignity. In that construction, the opposition became a historical body that had to be separated from the national identity in order to restore the image of a continuity of honour. In the land of the Bastille (the prison-fortress whose storming symbolised the French Revolution), this was de Gaulle’s own goal. It was the paradox of great politics seeking to turn victory into a final moral judgment on the past. When a society’s guilt is set apart as someone else’s guilt, it changes shape and passes into myth, and a myth defended for long enough begins to behave like truth.

Time, however, never remains within the boundaries of a single moral division. That is why the past does not accept amnesty. It remains in names, archives, family stories, political language and collective silence, until one day it becomes clear that what was declared finished history still shapes the way a society speaks about itself. In such a situation, the Vichy syndrome is a metaphor for a society trying to remove from its own biography what it does not like, to turn uncomfortable responsibility into someone else’s guilt, and to make history into a mirror in which it sees only its own idealised image.

That is where the French story ends and our question begins. Not because Serbia has kept its deepest shadows behind closed eyelids for centuries, nor because the Parisian opposition can be mapped directly onto any contemporary Serbian event, but because the same human and political need exists here as well. The French case is therefore not our model, but our mirror. One should not look in it for the same events, but for the same mechanism: that dangerous tendency, after a major conflict, not to seek the truth that will reconnect society, but a story that will allow one half of it to declare the other guilty for ever.

At this point, present-day Serbia can no longer be avoided. If the winner has acquired the right to truth, while the defeated no longer have the right to any truth at all, elections cease to be a way for society to resolve its political differences and become merely a new stage in its internal conflict. Power is then no longer seen as the temporary trust of citizens, but as the dignity of a tamed gaze, while the opposition is seen as an obstacle to be removed from the story of the nation.

However, the government is not Serbia, the opposition is not Serbia, the electoral majority is not Serbia, the protesting minority is not Serbia, just as no political moment can appropriate the entire history of a nation. Serbia is greater than any result, deeper than any mandate and longer-lasting than any government. That is precisely why every politics that identifies itself with the state sooner or later begins to make the same mistake, turning victory over an opponent into an attempt to defeat the plurality of society.

That is why a return to de Gaulle and his own goal suggests itself. A great politician may save the state, restore its self-confidence and leave behind a powerful historical myth, but no myth can replace the truth for ever. Serbia too, sooner or later, will have to learn the same simple yet difficult lesson: a state does not become strong when everyone says the same thing about it, but when it can endure different truths.

Clearly, the main test lies in the long post-election days. They will show whether victory has been accepted as responsibility or as spoils, whether defeat is a political episode or a national catastrophe, whether institutions will remain above parties, and whether society returns to itself after elections or continues to live as a prisoner of its own division.

Stretched and polarised. And for an unavoidable reason, perhaps it is better that life is finite, while our personal views, principled convictions and life compasses are infinite. For snap elections are neither the last nor the extraordinary word of democracy. They are only a moment in which society gives one side more political power than another.

Everything else has yet to happen.